Kalshi has a credible complaint about a Roosevelt Institute report claiming ordinary platform users lost $583.5 million. Yet its response also makes arguments that blur the line Kalshi tries to draw between prediction markets and traditional gambling.
Good to Know
Kalshi correctly identifies a basic weakness in the Roosevelt analysis. Maker and taker labels do not reveal whether a user is casual, professional or institutional.
A casual customer can become a maker by leaving a limit order in the book. Meanwhile, an experienced high-frequency trader can become a taker by accepting an available price. Using those labels as demographic categories can place both groups on the wrong side of the calculation.
Roosevelt therefore cannot confidently describe the full $583.5 million estimate as losses suffered by ordinary users. Kalshi calls that conclusion a product of “a hilariously wrong methodology error,” while Roosevelt maintains that everyday users often trade against professionals.
Kalshi also has a fair argument on skill gaps. Markets naturally include people with different information, experience and strategies. Unequal results alone do not prove that an exchange secretly operates like a casino house.
However, Kalshi weakens that case when it turns to recreational bettors.
Its response defends people who buy contracts without focusing heavily on price or expected value. Kalshi says they value exposure to an event and enjoy participating even when profit is not their main goal.
That description also fits millions of sports bettors. A fan who places $20 on a team for added interest seeks the same event exposure. Competitive exchange pricing may offer better value than fixed sportsbook odds, but the customer motive remains nearly identical.
Kalshi therefore cannot easily frame its price-insensitive customers as rational participants while treating comparable casino or sportsbook users as victims of an inherently illegitimate model.
Kalshi goes further by claiming approximately 0% of casino customers earn a profit because operators remove proven winners.
Casinos do restrict or exclude some advantage players. However, that practice confirms that profitable gambling can exist.
Professional poker players can beat the rake. Skilled sports bettors can profit through line shopping and pricing errors. Video poker players can find positive expected value under certain paytables and promotions. Blackjack card counters can gain a mathematical edge until a casino identifies them.
Kalshi argues that skilled traders deserve rewards for research and better judgment. The same logic applies to a successful sports bettor, poker player or card counter.
None of that rescues the Roosevelt methodology. Its maker and taker assumption may still invalidate the headline loss estimate. However, Kalshi would have produced a cleaner response by focusing on that error instead of making broad casino claims that its own reasoning contradicts.
Kalshi also alleges that casino industry influence helped shape the Roosevelt report. That claim needs separate evidence. A weak study does not automatically prove outside coordination or motivated research.